SIGNIFICANT APPROACHES TO REPRESSION AGAINST CBRN TERRORISM

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Abstract: In last years, there was emphasized need of wider conception of international counterterrorism campaign, which will not be limited to the punishment of the offenders of terrorist attacks but it will be oriented in the long term to all forms of fighting against organized crime, drug dealers, traffic in arms, people trafficking, against corruption and all forms of CBRN terrorism. In a context of restructuring of the NATO command structure it was decided to create a conformation „Centers of Excellence“, whose task is to improve the quality of education and training, improvement of level of interoperability and capabilities, development of doctrines and are experimental assessment and evaluation of new conceptions. On the territory of the Czech Republic it was establish international military entity JCBRN Defence COE to participate on repression against CBRN terrorism.

Keywords: Approaches, CBRN, Terrorism

1. General formation conditions of Centers of Excellence
Worldwide terrorist threat and possible danger to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are together with regional armed conflicts some of the main tension sources and security risks in the contemporary world. About it, that there are not any false threats, witness series of events from recent time, starting with the attack on World's Commercial Centre in New York, further chemical attack on civil population in Tokyo tube railway, until persistent effort of some extremist states to gain nuclear and radiological weapons.

Over permanent effort in the area of disarmament check there are irrevocable proofs about progressive development of WMD and instruments to transport them on aim. It makes possible first of all progressive and unstoppable technological development, when modern technology is nowadays accessible not only to a row of the unstable states, but even to different terrorist groups and movements. Continuous development of the nuclear, biological and chemical industry brings together also an increased danger of accidental and unintended unloading of dangerous materials to environment due to different accidents, natural disasters or damages in consequence of armed conflicts in frame operational activities of troops. This negatively exchanging character of security environment evoked a requirement to accelerate adjusting of NATO to the new world's security threats.

For this reason at the NATO-summit of Prague in November 2002, there was accepted a decision to create technologically advanced and flexible reactive forces of NATO, capable to hit anywhere it'll be necessary. Further it was decided about desirable restructuring the Command Structures of NATO and about initiative acceptance for developing defensive abilities of the Alliance - inclusive of acceptation five specific commitments on the protection against weapons of mass destruction (“CBRN Defence). It was decided as well, that one of effective forms to fill this initiative is the
specialization of individual member states to the specific defensive abilities, which is based on common responsibility sharing, costs and security risks sharing. Individual member states will preferential focus on the development and building certain powers and abilities exceeding their own need, and which will be subsequently provided for the benefit of other member states in the Alliance.

In connection with restructuring the Command Structures of NATO in years 2003-2004, there has been decided to create so-called “Centers of Excellence”, whose task is to improve the quality of education and training, increasing levels of interoperability and abilities, doctrine development and experimental consideration and evaluation new conceptions, always in given specific area according to delegated military-political ordering.

The Czech Republic has after previous appreciation of all possibilities decided to link at experiences of many years in the area of CBRN Defence and to commit the ČR Army with specialization on these problems. The ČR has further committed to active benefit at implementation of five specific obligations in the area of CBRN Defence. To receiving these strategic decisions in significant scale contributed previous experiences during activities of the Czech Armed Forces Chemical (CAF) Corps in coalition operations „Desert shield” and „Desert storm” in years 1990-1991 in Persian Gulf and especially the formation of the 9. Troop Chemical Protection, which was the first troop of the CAF detached for operations in the forces of immediate coalition reaction.

1.1 Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence

Protection Centre against weapons of mass destruction (CBRN Defence), which fulfills the task of National support element of host country for the benefit of the JCBRN Defence COE, is operating on the Czech Republic territory (ČR) since 2006. In the article is specified its benefit so for ČR, as for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Alliance, NATO). Further is described the financial standing of the international troops COEs (NATO) in outline on an experience basis of the CAF and is specified the place of the international troops (arrangement) in the structures of NATO and of the CAF. Not least, there are fixed requirements to the financial securing for activities of the International elements on the ČR territory [1].

Centre of protection Centre against weapons of mass destruction (CBRN Defence) arose officially on 1st July 2006 from the garrison of Vyskov as an independent subject with reorganizing the Centre of chemical army special training. Memoranda about understanding (MOU), constituent documents between the ČR, Allied Commander Transformation - ACT and participating states were signed on 26 October 2006. Activation of JCBRN Defence COE has had a run on 31 July 2007. In the structures of NATO is this element led since this day as Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centre of Excellence (JCBRN Defence COE). Significant landmark of history in JCBRN Defence COE building became the day of 27 June 2008, when the ČR government has taken notice about the Activation of the international military organization NATO on the ČR territory by adopting its resolution No.760 [2,3].

Existence of such arrangement on the ČR territory can be consider as an evaluation of capabilities and experiences of the troops, regiments and bunches of the Chemical Army (CAF) and Biological Protection Forces (CAF). Formation and building the Centre of CBRN Defence tied up on successful operation of the Chemical Corps of the CAF in Persian Gulf at the beginning 90. years, on successful activity of the multinational flag radiating, chemical and biological protection in following years and on many success in scientific and pedagogic work in the NBC Defence Institute and its predecessors [4].
2. Incorporation of Centers of Excellence within NATO

The Centers are national or multinational sponsored facilities, which provide special abilities and experiences in benefit of whole coalition, above all for supporting its transformation. They make possible to improve education and training on qualitative higher level, to improve interoperability and abilities in given area and to participate in the development of doctrines (above all STANAGs, service instructions and military publications) and conceptions of NATO through their certifying [5-9].

At present member states propose to the NATO 20 specialized Centers. Each of these Centers is focused on other specialized area.

Individual COEs aren't part of the new restructured NATO Command Structure. They are part of wider facilities framework, supporting Command Structure of NATO and creating part of so-called Alliance Command Arrangement (NATO Command Arrangement) [10-14].

Between COEs and High Command for transformation, there is no direct bond in command and control. Therefore ACT coordinates all requirements of NATO raised with activities of COEs.

2.1 Centers of Excellence Activity Conditions

Supposition of multinational representation - basic activity supposition is COEs is a multinational representation, which means in organizational structure COEs have to minimally work representatives of two alliance states.

Supposition of common representation - in order to observe the supposition of common representation COEs must be common. COEs are staffed by representatives of individual kinds of forces, it means by terrestrial, aerial and marine forces, because they provide products and services for all elements of armed NATO forces.

Supposition of focusing to the transformation support of NATO - next no less significant supposition is the principle of focusing to the transformation support of NATO. COEs have to be first of all focused to the support of ACT. COEs are expert advisers for the High Commanders of NATO in given expert areas.

2.2 Centers of Excellence Main Activity Principles

Principle of participation - to all member states of NATO has to be enabled participation on building and activities of COEs. Access to the performances and services provided by COEs is thing of the states sharing on activities of COEs, at simultaneous consideration of all security aspects of Alliance.

Principle of mutual non-competition and evident contribution - under principle of mutual non-competition and evident contribution to the present abilities understands providing these performances and services, which are not secured by any other organization in NATO framework. This requirement comes out from the principle of mutual non-competition and no activity duplication.

Principle of standards observance - next very important principle is the principle of NATO standards observance. Activity of COEs must be in accordance with corresponding standards and procedures valid in NATO.

Principle of transparent relations - between sponsoring Nation and authorized Strategic Command must be agreed transparent relations through operative memorandum about understanding (FMOU), eventually by technical treaty.

Principle of financing - principle of financing on national or multinational basis creates a basic assumption for securing of all COEs activities. Infrastructure costs, activities and run securing of COEs are financed national or multinational in dependence on the operative memorandum about understanding (OMOU) authorized by all sponsoring countries. OMOU is form of contractual relation concluded with participating countries. It determinates in article “Operational costs” competence and responsibility of
individual sponsoring countries for operational costs of COEs. Every contributory state covers personal costs of its employees send out to the COE according to its own national legislative norms, which host country must tolerate.

References


